Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications

Philosophy, Department of

10-1-1980

Review of The Later Philosophy of Schelling by Robert
Brown
Michael Vater
Marquette University, michael.vater@marquette.edu

Published version. Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol. 18, No. 4 (October 1980): 483-485. DOI.
© 1980 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc. Reprinted with permission by The Johns Hopkins
University Press.

BOOK REVIEWS

483

It is true. as Yovel argues, that a vIsIon of the totaltzatlon of the objects of the will fulfIlls a metaphysIcal need of
reason. But It IS wrong to impute to thIS vIsIon or representatIon a moral worth, SInce the formal moral law ha,
nothing to do with thIS or any other end but only wIth ",hat" ,tlpulated by the catcgoncallmperattve (P. 176)

Clearly Michalson has gone wrong at this pOint. and the essential rea,on IS that he has mlscomtrued
moral action. He tells us: "It is true. by Kantian ,tandard,. that every act of the wIll mu,t hal'e an
object. But such an object---or material content-is present only in a nOll-moral capacity. since only
the formal aspect. embodied in the categorical imperative, defines morality" (p. 176). Here he fail, to
recognize that a moral action never has a givell (phenomenal) ,tate of affaIrs as ItS object. but rather a
transformation of the given into a new form which fulfills moral purposes. Thus. the real object of a
moral act is a hypothetical moral state of affaIrs which It IS po, sIble to Impose on the given order of
phenomena. And this "object" is as much a postulate as is Yovel's ultImate Ideal world order-the
highest good a, the regulative idea of history In effect. then. to maintain that Yovel's Interpretation of
the highest good is illegitimate for the rea,ons gIven would be to Insist that no moral action is possible
at all within the Kantian framework. This wIll indicate the extent to which Michalson has gone a'tray.
Had he kept In mind Kant's comment about the nece,slty "to deny knowledge in order to make
room for faith" (B xxx), Michalson's conclusiom mIght have been more sound. For this faith IS not
merely rehgiou, faIth but a confidence in the whole moral endeavor of man. In fact. Kant's epi,temological limitations are "tailored to" the need, of morality. in a sen,e: and one of the important
achievement, of the first Critique IS the assurance that an Impasse of the kind suggested by Michalson
call not anse.
There are portIOns of Chapter 3 on the schematlsm. and of Chapter 4 on teleology, which might
have been developed into a positIve contributIOn to the understanding of Kant's project. But the work
as a whole is much longer than It needs to be. and the attempt at negative critici,m undermines the
possibility of any constructive conclUSIOns. Thus the unil1It1ated reader is more likely to be led a, tray
than enlightened by Michalson's efforts.
FREDERICK

P.

VAN DE PITTE
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Robert F. Brown. The Later Philosophy of Schelllllg. The Illfluellce of Boehme 011 the Works oj
1809-1815. Lewisburg. Pa.: Bucknell Ul11ver'lty Pre". 1977. Pp 295. $16.50.
Brown's study is sigl11ficant since it IS the first sustained expositIOn of Schelhng's philosophical
development to appear in English. Its partlcular focu, i, on the middle of Schelhng', career, the
attempt in the years 1809-15 to appropriate Boehme', heterodox and poetic philosophy of God and
with it to refashion the concept of philosophy a, a "system of Reason." Brown contends that this
cognitive reworking of Boehme' s theo,ophy (I) is re,ponsible for freeing Schelling from the arid
pantheism of the ,o-called System of Identity (1801-6) and (2) decI,lvely puts him on the path toward
the theIsm of the Later Philosophy ( 1821-54) with Its pecuhar double methodology of a speCUlative
and a historical approach toward the self-exI<,tent Actuahty. The fIrst part of the claim I, not credIbly
argued, whereas the second IS. Brown's title i, rather misleading: the book IS largely
exegesIs of the 1809 Essay 011 Humall Freedom. the 1810 Stuttgart Lecture". and the 1815 draft of
Ages of the World-works commonly called the "Middle Philo,ophy" or the "Philo,ophy of
Freedom." While Brown does not actually enter Into the exposition of the Later Philosophy. hi, most
novel and inSIghtful points concern the origin of the Later Philosophy in the phase of Schelling's
enchantment with the concepts and VISIOns of Jacob Boehme.
The study falls into two parts. a brief expmltlOn of Boehme (heavily dependent on Alexander
Koyre's La Phi/osop/lle de Jacob Boehme) and a more lengthy textual analY'I, of Schellmg', wntings
from 1809 to 1815. The overview of Boehme' s theosophlc speculatIOn i, clear and cogent, but
phrased in an abstract conceptual language that is far from Boehme's viVId Image,. Since It was
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Schelling and Hegel who first "translated" Boehme Into an abstract terminology. an already conceptualIzed Boehme will seem remarkably sImilar to Schelling. But such a doctrinal similarity is not at all
interesting unless one is led to see in detaIl how and why SchellIng turns back to philosophically
disreputable theosophlc sources such as Boehme and Oetinger for assistance and inspiration in the
pursuit of his project of thinking through the nature of human freedom and the precarIous nature of
man as "spirit." Brown misses a chance to display Schelling's speculatIve originality in everywhere
asserting a purely linear inheritance of Boehmean doctrine. It IS not clear from hIS presentation that
this "influence" is more than a matter of repetition. paraphrase. or perhaps plagiarism.
In the textual expositIOns that are the heart of his study. Brown shows how SchellIng works his way
from the abstract Absolute of the IdentIty-PhIlosophy toward the conceptIOn of a living. personal God
who actualizes himself in a process of undergoing and overcoming oppositIOn. Along this path.
asserts Brown, SchellIng draws upon six positions derived from or cognate to those of Boehme:
(I) Will or freedom is ontologically prior to essence, and even to existence. (2) God's being IS
grounded in an "other." which, though divine, is yet distinct from God as actual. conscious, and
personal. This "other." Nature, is the locus of creaturely being, which is both free and responsible for
its own good and evil. (3) Evil is no mere privation or secondary effect of finitude, but is disorder
within beIng itself. namely, the dissolutIOn of the structure of being. (4) God has two "centers" or
points of origIn, and he actualizes himself in a complex and temporal process of oppositionlinteraction
between them. (5) Man is both microcosmos and nllcrotheos: the ontological structures of God,
human nature, and the existing world are all correlative. Finally, (6) the Creation is necessary in its
essence (structurally parallel to God's) but contIngent in its existence (freely willed by God).
Brown frequently transgresses the limits of scholarly caution in suggestIng an exclusively
Bohemean origin for these elements in SchellIng's phIlosophy: (2) and (3) obviously bear the imprint
of the "mystic shoemaker," though (2) is better explained by Schelling's Flchtean roots and the role
that transcendental philosophy conceives the Not-Self to play In the evolution of consciousness. (I)
can stand as an emblem of Schelling's whole philosophical endeavor-before. during, and after his
enchantment with Boehme. (4) and (5) are carryovers to the philosophy of spirit of the logic basic to
the Philosophy of Nature and the Identity-Philosophy. As for (6), Brown himself emphaSIzes the
deliberate voluntarism of Schelling's Ages and notes that it distances him from Boehme's necessitarian vision of the creation. Brown speak;, more cautiously and more truthfully when he speaks of a
congenialIty or "natural affinity" between the categories and the problems of the two thinkers (p. 167,
n.42). Schelling found in Boehme the basic structures hIS own thought had already developed, but
expressed in a vivid poetic fashion. It is chiefly this poetic language which Schelling bon'ows and
freely uses to express his more abstractly worked-out conceptions.
Brown's study has both many virtues and many flaws. On the side of its virtues, I must note the
general clarity of exposItion and Its success in isolating and explaIning difficult concepts-Freedom
and Ages are among the murkiest of SchellIng's writings. There are helpful excursIOns on Schelling's
terminology, though regrettably confined to the notes. Brown's treatment of the works of the
"Philosophy of Freedom" as the gestation of the Later Philosophy is a novel and fruItful interpretIve
approach. The work's most obvious merit is that it approaches Schelling's philosophical odyssey as a
whole; armed with this book and Tillich' s brief Schelling's Positive Philosophy the general reader will
have a relIable guide to the problems and the conceptual structures of Schelling's thought.
What may satisfy the general reader may not satisfy the scholar. Brown's chosen theme, the
historical linkage between Boehme and SchellIng, is weakly and unconvincingly voiced. The
"influence" or SImilarity is never directly establIshed by direct textual comparions but is merely
asserted in a scattering of notes. Brown's approach to both Boehme and SchellIng IS lacking in
philosophical and hIstorical depth: for example, while he does take note of Neoplatonic Influences on
the Middle Philosophy, Brown ignore the rIch heritage of Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant. and Flchte whid
Schelling assimIlates, critIcizes, and transforms. And there are failures of scholarly detaIl too: Brown
asserts that the concepts of "the potencies" and the "fallen" nature of Individuals are taken from
Boehme in 1809; both figure prominently in the Identity-Philosophy, as Brown himself states in a
chapter devoted to Schelling's early philosophical development. Finally, it is surpriSIng that a work
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whose preface is dated 1975 and for which the l810 Stuttgart Lectures is a key text mentions the
existence of unedited alternate versions but is unaware of their publication-Version inedite des
Stuttgarter Pril'atvorlesungen, ed. M. Velo. (Torino. Bottega d·Erasmo. 1973).
MICHAEL G. V ATER
Marquette University

Jose Marfa Ripalda. The Divided Nation: The Roots of a Bourgeois Thinker: G. W. F. Hegel.
Translated by Fay Franklin and MaruJa Tillmann. Assen and Amsterdam: Van Gorcum. 1977.
Pp. 221.
Ripalda's principal theme is the state of the German nation in which Hegel's philosophy is shown to
have developed stage by stage. This is a nation shaped by the Enlightenment. romanticism, and the
French Revolution. and later disrupted by the Napoleonic Wars. The focus is upon the young
Hegel-hi~ social and intellectual milieu and his literary work-and there are frequent allusions to the
works of his maturity.
Ripalda maintains at the outset that Heger s scholarly work. as well as that of Christian Garve. upon
which he regards it as having been based. must be understood as culturally acquired (p. 23). Left to
conceive the term "culturally acquired" each according to his own tastes. few persons would take
exception to this position, which might after all have been a way of affirming Hegel's concept of the
historical self-conscIOusness. Ripalda appears to conceive cultural acquisition more narrowly. however, as later remarks will tend to confirm. The result IS a kind of psychologization and wciologization of Hegel's system which ~eems scarcely to allow that he may at points have transcended the
particularity of his personal circumstances to embrace principles worthy to be judged in respect to
their universal and perhaps lasting import.
This bias is complimented by a regrettable disposition to relegate to "the madness of speculation"
that in Hegel's conceptuality which fails to fall within the perview of the author's vantage pomt.
Certainly not every reader will find reason to accept the proposal that "the grandeur of Hegel which is
still impressive today, lies in the fact that his entire life was a struggle to reach an understanding of
capital. At the point where he loses himself to both his friends and his detractors in the madness of
speculation, he first perceives the contours of capital" (p. 163). One searches in vain for what he
means by "speculation" (nor does he seem to have taken account of Hegel's employment of the
concept). It appears that he may mean somethmg like "rumination."
This vantage point sets very definite limits to those aspects of Hegel's thought which prove highly
visible, although it does not obtrude itself in such a way as to render the work without value to the
reader who takes these into account. It sets the stage for emphasizing historical unfoldment, for
example, but appears to leave the author blind to Hegel's concern to exhibit these stages as constitulive of presently experienced identities. and to a great deal else.
The concludmg lines of the work. followmg Immediately upon the above citation, are suggeslive of
the psychologization and sociologlzation to which I referred. They suggest as well that Ripalda has
accorded very little attention to Hegel's effort to give dialectical expositon to the concretely actual, a
central aspect of his declared program.
The uncontrollable Impulse which led him to translate Into speculatIon his first naive attempts In order to overcome
more than personallackIngs IS that of abstractly neanng the ,upreme ab,traction; of nearing it as concretely as it is
itself concrete . . . . If Hegel still has not lost his spell. then neither has the great Abstraction But now there are to
[sic] many who don't accept it (Pp l63f)

In the introduction the author sets the divided German nation over against the Enlightenment.
which forms its immediate background. The first of the two parts following, "The' Di vided N alion' ,"

